CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 89

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from mortar fire unless security in the sorrounding area, which

included the isthmus separating Aden itself from the mainland was

assured. If the Federal forces were unable to establish the necessary

control in this area, British forces would have to move in for their own protection and, in these circumstances, we could hardly avoid being implicated in the actions of the Federal Government in countering the internal security situation. Our presence in Khormaksar could

also prejudice acceptance of the newly independent state by the United Nations. Furthermore, it would be difficult to withdraw our

forces at the time stipulated if the area were then in chaos. The

independent state would never be capable of defending itself adequately

against external aggression by the Egyptian forces in the Yemen, and

we should be pressed to retain our forces there beyond the agreed date

if, as was likely, the threat were not removed. Also, if we were to

implement our obligation to defend the Federation against external

aggression with forces stationed on its territory we should require a base on land and should have to negotiate some form of defence agreement.

The only way of avoiding the need to establish a base of this sort

appeared to be to decide to meet external aggression not defensively

but by retaliation through air attacks on targets in the Yemen or

Egyptian supply ships. The military implications of the Foreign

Secretary's proposals therefore needed further study.

In discussion there was general agreement that the best hope of achieving our objective of an orderly withdrawal lay in the proposals

for the timing of independence made by the Foreign Secretary. While we

had no vital interests in the area, and we might not necessarily be

damaged if eventually South Arabia fell under Egyptian domination, it

was certainly not in our interests or consistent with our responsibilities

either to leave chaos behind when we withdrew or to allow the United

Arab Republic to take South Arabia over immediately on independence.

Still less should we seek to make arrangements with the United Arab

Republic to this end in advance. Our friends elsewhere in the Middle

East, particularly Saudi Arabia and Iran, would be gravely disturbed

if we were to follow such a course, and our standing in the world

generally would suffer. Since we had no alternative to supporting the present Federal Government, we must do all that we could to keep them

AND together, while attempting to broaden their base, for this reason alone we should agree to give South Arabia some military support against external aggression for a period after independence. While it was by

no means certain that the independent state would be accepted into the United Nations or for that matter it would survive, the new timetable provided the best chance of achieving this.

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